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What is forgiveness, is it an act, an emotional state or both? Is forgiveness related to 
the wrongdoer's actions or (primarily) to his state of mind? Or, is it instead 
essentially a matter of the forgiver's mind? Is forgiveness essentially a matter of 
hearth or a matter of principle? What is the place of forgiveness in the web of related 
concepts? And most importantly, can forgiveness be justified? These are 
philosophical questions about forgiveness I want to address in this paper. My 
approach should be contrasted with the ways that theologians may wish to deal with 
the issue of forgiveness. According to some of them, in particular Eastern Orthodox 
theologians,' forgiveness is something that requires absolutely no justification 
whatsoever. For acts of forgiving are not to be done for a reason, and certainly not 
for different reasons at different times. We must forgive every time we have an 
opportunity to do so. Accordingly, forgiveness needs no justifying reasons because it 
is a matter of a divine command. Thus, any search for justifying reasons regarding 
acts of forgiveness and attempts to understand the roles they may play are not seen 
as a legitimate endeavor. However, if forgiveness is in no need of justification what 
is there for philosophers to do here? Obviously, one thing philosophers may do is 
assess this theological position on forgiveness, and should they find any weaknesses 
proceed to offer their arguments regarding the need for and ways of justifying acts of 
forgiveness. Indeed, I shall argue that acts of forgiveness, should they be seen to 
have any value at all, must be susceptible to the process of offering reasons for such 
acts and even their moral evaluation. 
Thus, the philosopher's proper job here is not to construct reasons for acts of 
forgiveness, but to explore the principles used in justifying forgiveness and possible 
range of their application. We are, therefore, back to the view of philosophy as a 
process of clarifying relevant concepts and conceptual distinctions. This primarily 
means to define these concepts and problems they raise, including explanations of 
their exact meaning, and determinations of the relationships among them and what 
they imply. These questions deal not only with possible moral aspects of the 
application of these concepts but even more importantly with the requirement of 
consistency that should preclude any confusion among these concepts and what they 
imply. We are dealing here with a cluster of issues which are easily confused and 
must therefore be precisely differentiated: forgiveness, excuse, justification, revenge, 
punishment, mercy, remorse and forgetting. To these we should add the grand issues 
of justice and injustice, fairness and unfairness, right and wrong, and the concept of 
evil. While, of course, philosophers deal with these issues formulating abstract and 
general theses, the only way for these theses to be of any relevance is that there are 
ways to apply them to some actions or practices in the real world. This is how I will 
approach my topic in the present paper. 
To begin this business of conceptual clarification let us start with perhaps the easiest 
case of confusion. Often the activity of offering excuses is mistakenly identified with 
instances of forgiveness: should there be any reason for the person on the receiving 
end to excuse the harmful action done to him, there is no room in that case for 
forgiveness. He may well still take the action in question as wrong, but by holding 
that there exists some acceptable causal explanation for it, he removes it from the set 
of actions for which the agent can be held responsible, and, therefore, from the 
domain of actions that can be properly forgiven. Should the fact that a wrongful 
action may be causally explained imply some sort of justification, we would be in 
double trouble: first, there would be nothing there which could be a proper subject of 
forgiveness; for, when a justification can be offered for an act, even though in some 
sense it is clearly wrong, then this act is in effect excused - the excuse may be based 
on some other allegedly more important aspect of the act or on the basis of the larger 
context in which it was performed. Second, forgiveness cannot be entirely 
reasonless. However, if it is the case that when I know reasons for someone's act, 
i.e., when I understand the action, I in fact must see it as justified, then the 
understanding of an act by itself precludes the possibility of forgiveness; so, it would 
seem that the very act of forgiveness is a self-annulling act. Consequently, an act of 
forgiving is not an act of justifying the committed wrongful action; thus, the reason 
which figures in forgiveness cannot consist of the explanation of that action or its 
understanding based on its explanation, i.e., this reason cannot be simply about that 
action, but must instead (also) pertain to something else. Therefore, we must 
precisely determine what this something else is. Here we have two possible options: 
first, to locate the reason in the person who commits the action, in a way that 
separates him from his bad action as when we say that we forgive someone because 
we feel pity for him, i.e., that we forgive him although he does deserve 
condemnation; and second, to locate this reason in us, the forgivers. The first 
possibility can again be interpreted in two ways: the term "condemnation" may be 
taken in its ordinary moral sense, as a personal feeling of moral indignation which in 
effect gets removed from the inventory of our feelings with our act of forgiveness, 
and therefore we no longer "condemn" that person - thus, he or she is, as it were, free 
of condemnation - and this really is true forgiveness. However, as we shall see, this 
case reduces to the case when the reason for forgiveness is located within the 
forgiver rather than the wrongdoer. Alternatively, we may take "condemnation" in a 
stronger sense which indicates that the person ought to endure some punishment 
although later we may "forgive" him and in that case he would be spared of his 
punishment - in this way the wrongdoer "gains" something as a result of our 
forgiveness. I believe it is a mistake to think that the wrongdoer could be the locus 
of the reason for forgiveness; this possibility isn't in fact a part of the meaning of 
"forgiveness" because, on the one hand, we could forgive a person without him ever 
knowing that he had been forgiven, and, on the other hand, even in the case that our 
forgiveness isn't sincere the wrongdoer's gains remain preserved, and in this case it 
would be difficult to say that we have truly forgiven him. In fact this is not 
forgiveness at all, this in fact falls in an entirely different category, the category of 
merciful acts. This is so because, unlike forgiveness, mercy does not require 
sincerity as a necessary condition, for as soon as we allow someone to gain 
something he did not deserve, or does not have a right to, we have an act of mercy. 
On the other hand, however, the wrongdoer must have some awareness of the fact 
that he has benefited in some way, or else the act of mercy would not exist. This 
leaves the possibility of locating the constitutive reason for forgiveness in us, the 
forgivers. In a certain way, even when we rid ourselves of moral indignation as a 
result of forgiving someone this primarily relates to us who forgive, and this is the 
proper place to seek a definition of forgiveness. Only if we offer a definition of 
forgiveness as an attempt to overcome in ourselves the ill will towards a certain 
source of evil - as an attempt to overcome bitterness, ill feelings and a wish for 
revenge - can we have a definition of forgiveness that avoids the pitfalls mentioned 
above, which will at the same time enable us to find reasons for doing that at all. 
These reasons can be of different kinds. For instance, they can be utilitarian in 
nature, as when we judge that it would pay off to somehow rid ourselves of all 
negative feelings and in this way save time and energy, reduce mental anguish and 
achieve other beneficial effects. One might think that such beneficial effects will 
best be achieved if we adopt the practice of forgiving as a widely practiced rule of 
conduct. However, the effects of such systematic forgiving would in all likelihood 
be short-lived, and considering the long term perspective the consequences could 
overturn the results of the utilitarian calculations. This will happen every time the 
short-term benefits serve to undermine some crucial values that those negative 
feelings serve to protect. For example, the value of self-respect is in an important 
way fostered by the ability to wish for revenge. Self respect itself is what makes for 
the possibility of universal respect and any other form of respect, including respect 
for moral values: respect for individuals as free and responsible human beings. One's 
tendency to easily forgive can be seen as a symptom of one's lack of self-respect, just 
as frequent refusal to forgive can be seen as a symptom of arrogance and moralizing. 
This later also always includes excessive pride, primarily as a sort of epistemic 
hubris, which brings about the surplus of authority on which moralizing is based. 
If we define forgiving as an attempt to conquer or come to grips with resentment in 
oneself, the question then arises of whether we are at all capable of such an act. Any 
such attempt can meet with success or failure. Forgiving, as a technique of 
overpowering feelings of resentment, as a sort of purification, could not count on 
success as a sure thing, just as, for instance, in the case of believing: having a belief 
is not a matter of decision. The analogy between forgiveness and believing is that 
they both include an element which is not within our power. Just as having a belief 
incorporates an element of awareness - the presence of the object of belief "in the 
awareness of believing" - forgiveness includes within itself an element of forgetting: 
the absence of the action or experience of these feelings. (Of course, we may decide 
to forgive but the realization of the desired beneficial effects, which the practice of 
this technique should bring about, is not a matter of this decision.) An act of 
forgiveness relates, therefore, only to the subject and his feeling, and include no 
practical treatment of the object or beneficiary of forgiveness. In a certain sense, 
forgiving has nothing to do with the beneficiary but only affects the person who 
forgives because it involves his own dilemma of whether to forgive or suffer from 
the unpleasant presence of negative feelings. The goodness of the act which then 
could be done may be defined in two ways: (1) utilitarian, that anything that is more 
useful (e. g. what is easier) is better because it will bring more benefit or happiness 
in the future (if the immediate future is in question, it is easier to forgive or give up, 
but generally it is not easy to say what is more useful); and (2) what is right is what 
satisfies a certain moral requirement, for instance, the requirements of justice or 
equity, but in the long-run this requirement might contain increasing prospects for 
overall welfare, even in the sense of happiness or benefit. 
However, the necessary presence of sincerity in forgiveness gives it a strictly moral 
connotation. Unlike forgetting, forgiving does not merely imply the final 
disappearance of the negative feelings of hatred, indignation or a wish for revenge. 
Instead, we can speak of forgiveness only if such acts are done for moral reasons. 
Forgiving does not mean merely erasing these negative feelings. It means erasing 
them in such a way that preserves an awareness of what had initially caused them, 
and even preserves an awareness of the tendency of these causes to continue to 
generate those negative feelings, but at the same time provides a kind of self-control 
which eliminates those feelings. Forgiving is therefore not the same as forgetting. It 
is a specific combination of preventing the effects of these negative feelings and 
preserving an abstract awareness of the real existence of their cause. The cause is 
actual and the consequence is abstract. As an attitude that defines forgiving as 
dynamic relationship towards its object, forgiveness is considerably different from 
forgetting in that it is an active relationship. Forgetting is something that can merely 
happen (and will actually happen because everything will be forgotten given enough 
time; there is nothing that won't be forgotten as this is part of one of the basic 
characteristics of our world - temporality). If forgiving were reduced to mere 
forgetting, then this would be a passive relationship, either reconciling oneself to or 
escaping from reality. The determination of activity (which was already included in 
the requirement of sincerity) puts the action of forgiving directly into the context of 
morality. Just as the offense which we want to forgive is an act for which the 
wrongdoer bears responsibility, primarily because it is attributed to him as his own 
act which hurts or degrades us (otherwise we would have nothing to forgive), so 
forgiveness is an act through which we leave intact the content of that offense (the 
act of the offender as the cause of our negative feelings) and we replace an active 
attitude (rejection of that content) with another active attitude (an abstract 
"recollection" of that content). As an act, forgiveness is something we make our own 
decision about, which must be attributed to us as our own act for which we bear 
responsibility.  
 The question raised here has to do with the conditions under which we can face this 
responsibility, or, to put it simply, the question of whether there is a right to forgive. 
I think that forgiving is morally justified only if it is done in a way that preserves the 
conditions of the possibility for universal respect for any person as a moral agent. In 
this context, however, this implies the preservation of self-respect. We shall not 
dwell further on the explanation of the relationship between self-respect and 
universal respect. It suffices to say that one cannot exist without the other and this 
mutual dependence is necessary in the moral sense. But since forgiveness relates to 
an act which is an affront to us and negates precisely this hypothesis about universal 
respect, then forgiveness, as far as its moral justification is concerned, can ultimately 
perhaps be an act of supererogation. This opens the problem of demarcation, when 
this can and when cannot be the case. In the latter case it seems that the act of 
forgiving is a form of complicity with the offense or crime because to forgive means 
to accept, reconcile oneself to what has happened, absolve the offender and in a 
sense approve and authorize his act, because in morals we are dealing with values 
that are (in a normative sense) absolute, immeasurable, inexchangeable and 
irreplaceable. Consequently, unlike religion, ideology, politics, business and other 
spheres of everyday life, morality does not allow for the possibility of tolerance. 
Tolerance is the demarcation line between that which is permissible from that which 
is impermissible. In practice, what is morally permissible is what is in a way morally 
indifferent, and it is the subject of legitimate freedom, while what is morally 
impermissible can absolutely not be tolerated and its tolerance (by others) would 
mean abandoning the basic principle of moral evaluation (in oneself). Tolerance is 
possible only when I tolerate something with which I disagree, something that is 
unpleasant, odious and repulsive to me (otherwise, there is no need to speak of 
tolerance at all). It is morally possible only if it means doing something without 
degrading or undermining one's own moral integrity. This can only happen outside 
morality, in the area of legitimate freedom. Although freedom is a precondition of 
morality (making the attributions of responsibility possible), there is no freedom (or 
the possibility of different evaluation) in the area of morality. When tolerance goes 
beyond the line between permissible and impermissible and enters the domain of the 
unacceptable supererogation, we no longer have supererogation at all, but instead the 
morally wrong. It is not possible, for example, to tolerate lies and it makes no sense 
to say that tolerance implies that the person who lies has the right to expect of others 
to assent to the information content of his statements. For that reason the right to lie 
cannot exist. A similar conclusion may be drawn in the case of forgiving when it 
implies complicity in something that cannot be tolerated. The right to forgiveness 
does not exist in such cases. When does it then exist? 
In order to answer that question, let us view this problem from another angle. 
Revenge is considered morally wrong, not because of the values that revenge 
universally defends, but because these values cannot be defended by revenge 
because revenge inherently contains an element of arbitrariness that eludes 
universalizability. The object of revenge can therefore be morally justified and 
morally demanding only as a condemnation, which is directly opposed to forgiving. 
This way out from the starting situation also presents difficulties. Namely, in order 
to condemn one should have something that is usually lacking - certainty. 
Universality is not enough. Who gives you the right to judge? What makes you think 
that you would not do the same if you were in his shoes? However, this question is 
wrongly put, because we are not concerned with a right as it seems to stem from an 
element of revenge for which there can be some justification. Like forgiveness, 
revenge is the exclusive "right" of the victim. If in that sense we see condemnation 
as a "right", then we would have only to abide by the golden rule, that says we 
should not do to others what we would not like others to do to us, provided that the 
condition of sincerity was there just as in the act of forgiving: but one could also of 
one's own free will give up condemnation in order to forgive or show mercy. The 
notion of right is too weak in this case because we are here dealing with a duty and a 
right that stems from and accompanies this duty. It is therefore not important what I 
would do in a given situation (because moral judgment does not depend on my 
readiness to forgive or take revenge), but what is important is what I ought to do. 
The difference between moral judgment and revenge boils down to the necessity of 
universalization and not to the wish to tailor justice for the sake of revenge or 
punishment. To be sure, it can be said that this position is in a certain sense tragic 
because here we have no right to judge (for, on the one hand, we can give up that 
right, but, on the other, we can never base it on the certainty of moral guilt or the 
certainty of an authority to act as a judge because there is no absolute certainty that 
there was no valid justification for the act in question), but it is our duty to judge, 
although the right that accompanies this duty and is simultaneously an element and a 
precondition for its application, is at the same time uncertain and ill-defined. 
It is not difficult to see that forgiveness may easily collide with the obligation we 
have to ourselves to safeguard our own moral integrity, since forgiving is closely 
aligned with our coming to grips with the corresponding injury. There is one morally 
adequate reason that can justify forgiveness, and it can be stated in terms of the 
requirement that one overcomes one's own arrogance and excessive pride. This 
reason obviously cannot apply to all acts that we see as humiliating to us. It does, 
however, apply to many instances, in particular to the cases of those with touchy 
characters. These are interesting cases as they have a form of forgiveness: after 
"suffering injury" one has the option to forgive or not. In fact, this is not so, since 
these are cases when one not only may forgive but ought to do so, i.e., has a duty to 
forgive. If we have sufficient moral courage, we will be able to come to the 
realization that there was no injury in the first place. Thus, what appears as 
forgiveness is only a sort of self-enlightement. 
In another case, self-respect is not undermined when we forgive a repenting 
offender. In this case forgiving is acceptable, but not necessary and morally 
obligatory as in the previous case. However, if we see forgiveness as a virtue, then 
this may not seem sufficient. On the one hand, repentance cannot retroactively 
justify the committed wrongdoing, and cannot play the role of an excuse. 
Repentance could neither turn the offense into a moral act, nor could it be 
independent from the offense (unlike in the cases of acting from ignorance, affect or 
diminished rationality, which could be reasons for excuse). Repentance, however 
desirable, cannot ultimately imply that our acts had been right or diminish our 
responsibility for them. On the other hand, if something (i.e., forgiveness) is a virtue 
then it is not only acceptable but something that ought to be done. This would mean 
that repentance may generate the right to forgiveness, but this is obviously not the 
case. The most we can conclude is that in some cases it would be odious or 
inappropriate not to forgive the repenting wrongdoer. This would be a sign of some 
shortcoming on our own part. But even if there is an obligation to forgive, it should 
not be viewed as an obligation to the repenting wrongdoer but as an obligation to 
ourselves. This preserves the definition of forgiveness as something that relates 
exclusively to the forgiver himself, and not the wrongdoer. 
The thesis that forgiveness involves forgetting leads us to the impression that 
forgiving implies abandoning the punishment for a certain offense: we have not only 
overcome our feeling of ill will towards the offender and forgiven him (as victims 
and therefore the only people with the right to forgive), but "we" become a political 
force that abolishes justice. In that case, forgiveness can also mean that the offender 
is pardoned and that we (who are not victims) forgive simply because we have the 
power to do so. This also means that we are sacrificing the victims once again, 
showing that we never cared about them in the first place, and this can certainly not 
be universalized. But if only victims have the right to forgive, then forgiveness and 
punishment must be separated just as revenge and punishment are separated (and 
this separation was not done because revenge is always unfair but because it may be 
unfair as, unlike legal punishment, it does not necessarily imply impartiality as the 
crucial element of any valid criterion of justice). 
Punishment is not solely and exclusively the matter of the victim (like forgiveness or 
revenge). This brings us to a new set of reasons for differentiating between 
forgiveness and mercy, because it is one thing to offer moral justification of actions 
and quite another to offer their legal justification, regardless of the fact that the very 
existence of legal instruments has a moral foundation and that their structure is 
subject to moral evaluation. Without that foundation, law would be a mere 
application of force and the application of moral criteria would be lost and 
practically become senseless. This would in turn pave the way to moralism, various 
moralistic ideologies and a general moral suspiciousness that would ultimately result 
in moral terrorism and the replacement of the rule of law by a moral ideology based 
on one of the many possibilities of moral reductionism. We know this from history 
and from our own experience. On the other hand, the legal as opposed to the 
ideological articulation of negative feelings such as revenge or envy leaves some 
room for practically relevant freedom in which, of course, there is no room for 
forgiveness but importantly there is room for its substitution in the form of the 
presumption of innocence principle. This is the basis of the rule of law, and although 
this order is different from moral order, it has moral backing not only in the weaker 
sense of permissibility but also in the stronger sense of moral obligatoriness. The 
presumption of innocence principle is void of uncertainties and arbitrariness that are 
inherent in forgiveness and revenge. But if we separate forgiveness from mercy, then 
we can forgive without this act being followed by a corresponding act of mercy in 
the form of a request that the wrongdoer be absolved. Forgiveness is a matter of our 
will and ability to do so without violating any of the established duties. On the other 
hand, fair sentencing is a matter of justice. Therefore, forgiveness again remains 
constrained exclusively to the realm of morality without any legal bearing.  
 
